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FOREIGN INVESTMENT ISSUES FOR INTERNATIONAL
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS:
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH PROJECTS IN CHINA AND
THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
Timothy C Evered"

I. INTRODUCTION

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)' engaged in
international investment projects confront significant and unique
challenges. Similar to for-profit enterprises, NGOs active in foreign
contexts face problems and uncertainties commonly encountered by
international investors.2 Although NGOs conduct international
projects for different purposes than for-profit investors, they engage
in many of the same activities in foreig countries. These activities
include the purchase and use of property, importing or exporting

" J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1996. The author would like to express
his appreciation to John R. Schmertz, Jr., Professor of Law, Georgetown University
Law Center, and to Robin Junger, Sessional Instructor, University of Victoria Faculty
ofLaw, for their comments on the earlier drafts of this article. The author also wishes
to thank Steve Klingelhofer of the International Center for Not-For-Profit Law,
Washington, DC, for assisting in the research for this paper. The views expressed
herein are solely those of the author.
' A variety of terms are used to describe entities that this paper will refer to as NGOs.
These terms include "not-for-profit," "private volunteer organization," "charitable
organization," "foundation," "civic organization," "third sector organization,"
"international agency,""civic society organizations," and "international organization".
While these terms are often used interchangeably, they may suggest distinctions in the
function, status, or context of the organization. Additionally, different sectors and
disciplines may use one or more of these terms exclusively. This paper focuses on a
U.S.-based private volunteer organization, registered as a non-profit organization
under 501 (c)
of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, engaged in charitable activities in the
field of international health. See generally THE INT'L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PRoFrr LAW,
THE BLu ERms PROJECT, ISSUE PAPER (1994).
2 A broad definition of "foreign investment" may include the foreign project activities
of NGOs. See Ewell E. Murphy, Jr. The Andean Decisions on ForeignInvestments:
An InternationalMatrix ofNationalLaw, 24 INT'L LAw. 643,646 (1990).
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goods, creating employment relationships and contracting for services
in the host country.
Due to their restricted legal status in some foreign countries,
or incomplete host country regulations, NGOs must overcome
problems specific to their goals and the legal context in which they
function. These problems involve tax issues, customs exemptions,
legal status and recognition, dispute resolution, host country
agreements, insurance and import/export controls. Many of these
issues create persistent or potential difficulties for international NGOs
involved in investment like activities.
In certain aspects of foreign investment, NGOS have
advantages over for-profit international investors. Because of their
valued humanitarian and volunteer activities, issues traditionally
problematic for international investors3 are often mitigated and more
easily overcome by NGOs. Such advantages, however, usually
depend on particular foreign contexts, may be uncertain and may
change with local political dynamics.
Despite these advantages, the incomplete legal regime related
to NGO foreign investment activities in many countries (and under
international law), as well as the difficulty of applying commercial law
to NGOs and their activities, create impediments and uncertainty for
NGOs engaged in international projects. The risks and complications
associated with international NGO activities, and their extensive
international role, necessitate consideration of the foreign investment
issues encountered by NGOs.
This paper focuses on the foreign investment activities of U.S.based NGOs involved in international projects, the types of issues they
encounter and some possible solutions to problems that can and often
do arise. Specifically, the activities of U.S.-based NGOs involved in
international health projects highlight the types of problems
international NGOs encounter. Case studies of the former Soviet
Union and China indicate the nature of these problems.
' See John A. Westberg & Bertrand P. Marchais, GeneralPrinciplesGoverning
Foreign Investments as Articulatedin Recent InternationalTribunalAwards and
Writings of Publicists,7 ICSID REv. FoREIGN INvESTmfEr L.J. 453 (1992).
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The examples discussed in Section IV indicate certain types of
problems and issues unique to international NGOs working in the
former Soviet Union and China. These examples suggest that such
issues should be examined in other foreign contexts to determine the
extent these or other issues confront international NGO projects in
particular host countries. These examples also show the importance
of host country agreements and the precarious status of international
NGOs under the laws of many foreign countries.
Section V discusses the applicability of international
commercial law to NGOs. It argues that international arbitration may
mitigate some of the problems NGOs encounter in disputes with host
governments and in difficulties relating to their lack of legal status.
Section V also argues that international commercial laws relating to
arbitration may not apply to international NGOs or offer adequate
protection. Although this paper touches on a number of significant
issues indicated by the case studies presented in Section IV, the use of
international arbitration as a means of dispute resolution and the
problems of national and international legal status or recognition for
international NGOs serve as the focus of this paper.
In sum, this paper discusses the general nature of NGOs,
including their domestic and international status and their contrasts
with for-profit entities. Second, it considers the agreements created
by international NGO projects, and the issues they address.
Third, it explores the problems and risks indicated by
international NGO projects and agreements related to them. Fourth,
projects conducted by an international health NGO in China,
Kazakstan4 and Uzbekistan show the types of foreign activities
conducted by international NGOs and the issues they raise. Finally,
provision in international commercial instruments important to NGO
foreign activities and considerations for NGOs related to international
arbitration are explored.

4 The Kazakstan Republic recently changed the spelling of its name from the
Russian "Kazahkstan". The new spelling is used here.
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II. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
One important distinguishing feature of NGOs is the non-profit
purpose of their activities. While some activities of NGOs are similar
in nature to for-profit commercial activities, their purpose differs
significantly from that of for-profit enterprises. Even in their revenuegenerating activities, NGO functions ultimately relate to their essential
non-profit mission.5 Because of this distinct purpose, NGOs take on
different functions and activities, operating in fields and areas that may
be unusual for commercial entities.
Additionally, the organization and legal setting of NGOs differ
from those of for-profit corporations. Much of the powers,
capabilities and structure of an NGO depends on the laws under which
it is established or registered. Examples of such registration include
section 501(c) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, registration for
consultative status with the U.N. Economic and Social Council and
registration in foreign legal systems. 6
Although NGOs are domestic in organization and status, they
may be international in the focus of their activities. While NGOs are
increasingly active internationally, NGOs are entirely defined and
established by national law.7 Despite a proliferation of international
NGOs, no international legal regime exists for recognizing the status
of NGOs under international law.' However, a number of regional

This principle of tax-exempt status for income generating activities related to an
NGO's mission is incorporated in the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, § 501 (c) and nonprofit laws of other countries, including the 1994 Russian Civil Code. See Yevgeny
S

Sukhanov, Nonprofit Organizations in Russia: Property andLegal Status, In NGO
World Learning Inc., Forum I,
Winter 1995.

LAW IN BRIEF IN THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATES,

See e.g., Law Concerning Social Organizations in the Republic of Uzbekistan,
adopted Feb. 15, 1991, Chapter 5; Law on Public Associations of the Republic of
Kazakstanm June 27, 1991.
7 Id. at 328.
' Limited regional instruments exist on the recognition of international NGOs; see
note 30, infra and Beigbeder, note 10, infra at 331-33. Two international NGOs
receive some recognition under international law: the International Committee of the
6
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proposals and initiatives have been made to establish a mechanism to
recognize and protect NGOs by multilateral agreement.9
Where and how an NGO is registered and organized also
provides a means of categorizing NGOs. Other methods of
categorizing NGOs include their purposes and functions, their
relationship to government activities and their stage of evolution.10
Such categories are important in distinguishing the types of activities
NGOs conduct, their legal rights and the likely problems they may
encounter.
In the absence of a widely accepted international agreement on
the recognition and legal status of international NGOs, such groups
engaged in international projects must rely on and derive their legal
personality and status from NGO laws in foreign host countries, or
from host country agreements. Unfortunately, foreign NGO laws are
inconsistent and often do not provide adequate protection, and host
country agreements may be difficult to obtain or enforce.
Such laws, aside from lacking comparative uniformity, may
pose three essential problems. First, foreign countries may not have
any laws relating to NGOs. Second, even if a host country has laws
governing NGOs, they may only cover domestic NGOs and not have
provisions for foreign based international NGOs. Finally, host country
laws may be incomplete and inconsistent in application, or
unnecessarily restrictive.
Where laws on NGOs exist, they may provide a variety of
benefits for international NGOs. These benefits may include laws
allowing recognition, tax exemptions to the NGO, its employees or
Red Cross under the Geneva Conventions, see note 10, infra at
61-78, and the International Olympic Committee, see David J. Ettinger, The Legal
Status of the InternationalOlympic Committee, 4 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 97.
9 See note 10, infra.
See generally YvEs BEIGBEDER, THE ROLE AND STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANrrARIAN VOLUNTEERS AND ORGANIZATIONS: THE RIGHT AND DUTY TO
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 79-94 (1991) (discussing NGO typologies).
10

I

See Special Provision of the President of Kazakstan On Order of State
Registration ofLegalPersons by Agencies of the Ministry ofJustice, July 14, 1995,

providing for recognition of NGOs. Anaylsis of the Legislation of the Republic of
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transactions, tax benefits to donors as an incentive to make
contributions, legal personality, and exemption from customs and
other fees. Such benefits may also derive from specific agreements
between the host government and the international NGO. Of
particular importance is the legal personality and certainty accorded
the international NGO by adequate foreign laws or a comprehensive
host country agreement.
NGOs active internationally have important similarities with
for-profit foreign investors. Often, NGOs and for-profit entities
engage in similar projects, such as constructing and operating
facilities, training and managing personnel, and importing or exporting
materials and supplies. Both types of investors confront common
infra structural or logistical problems, similar cost and administrative
concerns, and the potential for host country discrimination against
foreign investors.
Both NGOs and for-profit investors may also suffer under laws
providing limited legal status and rights and face difficulty when
disputes arise with foreign parties or the host government. As one
observer notes, in reference to the dispute resolution difficulties
confronting international NGOs:
When an international agency [NGO] contracts with a
sovereign government, the international agency has no
means of enforcement or recourse against that
government if that government breaches its
contractual duties, except for remedies made available
by the government itself In this context, the NGO is
in a situation similar to that of a private investor...
Kazakstan on NGOs, prepared by InterLegal, Kazakstan, 1995.
2
Gregory W. MacKenzie, Note, ICSID Arbitrationas a Strategy for Leveling the
PlayingFieldBetween InternationalNon-GovernmentalOrganizationsandHost
States, 19 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 197, 205 (1993).
" See Jeswald W. Salacuse, Host CountryRegulation andPromotionof Joint
Ventures andForeignInvestment, in JOINT VENTuRING ABROAD: A CASE STUDY
(David N. Goldsweig ed., 1985).
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NGO and for-profit investors also employ similar contracts, confront
parallel dispute resolution problems and face difficulties from the
inadequacies or restrictions of local corporate or NGO laws.13
As noted above, NGOs may find themselves in a privileged
position because of their altruistic, non-profit mission. Conversely, in
some instances, host countries in transition from state-controlled
economies may initially pay more attention to developing a positive
climate for commercial investors in order to attract international
investment, thus neglecting NGOs or failing to provide them adequate
legal protection or status. NGOs and for-profit entities may also have
different organizational structures, bottom-line concerns, types of
activities and roles or functions of their contracts. Such differences
can make for-profit investors less disadvantaged in some foreign
contexts.
Given these similarities and differences, NGOs confront unique
problems in international projects. These problems arise from the
absence of laws relating to NGOs, host country laws that provide
limited standing to sue and create or enforce contracts, and foreign
Unique problems confronted by
unfamiliarity with NGOs.
international NGOs also arise with the difficulty of applying
international commercial law to NGOs.
Where NGO laws do not exist, NGOs may sometimes find
protection in international instruments relating to commercial
transactions and the commercial laws of the host country. The extent
of this protection and the application of commercial laws to NGO
activities depends on whether key provisions can be interpreted
broadly to include not-for-profit activities. Thus, for example, the
definitions of "investment" under Article 25 of the International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention (ICSID
Convention), and "commercial" under reservations to the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (New York Convention) may determine the applicability of
these instruments to NGO foreign activities.
Additionally, NGOs may be covered by foreign incorporation
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laws that use such terms as "association" or "entity". However, even
where applicable to international NGOs, international and foreign
commercial law may not provide the benefits or protections necessary
to make humanitarian work as effective as it might be otherwise. The
examples below highlight these problems in the context of NGO
international health programs.
Ill. TYPICAL AGREEMENTS AND CONTRACT ISSUES
The NGO international health programs outlined in Section IV
involve a set of agreements and raise a number of contract issues.
International NGOs enter into a set of agreements which are both
similar to and different from those involved in for-profit foreign
projects. International health programs may require contracts
between the NGO, host government, donor or joint venture foreign
investor, and a local in-country partner. These agreements may be
general and non-binding or create specific obligations. Additionally,
these agreements may set out program specifics and a plan of action
or the timing of the project, creating aspirational goals rather than
binding commitments. 4
An initial and important contract is the donor commitment or
funding agreement establishing a health development program.' 5 The
conditions placed on donated funds, and their purpose, often
determine the ultimate structure of the NGO's programs. 6 While the
examples discussed here indicate the use of agreements to formalize

" An example of this type of agreement was used in the hospital construction example
below conducted in China. The "Team Agreement," builds on the Principles of
Cooperation signed four years earlier, summarizing the progress of the planing phase
of the project and sets out goals and obligations for the construction phase.
'" The agreement between the joint venture and international NGO establishing the
program discussed below in Kazakstan, in contrast to the agreement with China noted
above, is described as a "professional service agreement" and creates a comprehensive
and specific contract between the funder and NGO.
16 Id The agreement sets initial program priorities, designates the NGO as the overall
program coordinator and creates an alliance between the JV and NGO to heath
education programs and other support to the host country.
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the funding relationship, donors often give to NGOs without specific
conditions on the use of funds. These relationships may start with a
statement of understanding or cooperative assessment agreement.
Where host governments initiate programs, the process may also
involve a needs assessment, memo of understanding or general
agreement to initiate or explore programs, either between the relevant
national ministry or the local government partner.17
Just as the memo of understanding between the NGO and a
donor usually precedes a more elaborate and specific arrangement, a
formal agreement typically follows the initial expression of
understanding between the NGO and host government. The NGO
may enter into an agreement with a local government or public health
entity that acts as a program partner or official contact. These host
country agreements provide a number of benefits and delineate the
relationship between the relevant parties. First, they may determine
the status ofthe NGO in the host country, creating a legal personality
and the ability to contract, sue and own property."' Second, such
agreements can provide direct benefits for the NGO in support of its
programs. The host country may agree to provide office space,
transportation or housing for foreign employees in addition to its
direct involvement in joint programs. Third, these agreements usually
include tax, customs and regulatory exemptions in keeping with the

"7An initial agreement establishing the program in China described below creates a
framework of obligations between the NGO and a host country medical university to
develop plans for a pediatric treatment and medical training facility in China.
The agreement with the medical university partner was then confirmed by the local
municipal government.
"s The agreement with local Chinese authorities includes the obligation to "accept
[the NGO] as a private, non-profit entity whose purpose... is to assist with the
planning and equipping of the new pediatric center and with the planning and
conducting of teaching programs." Id. at art. 3(A). The agreement does not explicitly

delimit the NGO's legal rights or status, but provides for the exemption of the NGO
from taxes and government fees.
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non-profit mission of the NGO.19 Finally, host country agreements
usually state the program objectives or commitments of the
international NGO.2
IV. NGO HEALTH PROGRAMS AND INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS2 1
The following examples of NGO international health programs
show the similarities of such not-for-profit activities to those of
traditional for-profit international investment. These examples also
demonstrate the problems NGOs confront in international programs
related to the public health development sector, as well as the
difficulties specific to transitional and communist countries, such as
China?' and the former Soviet Union.' They also indicate that the
problems faced by NGOs in foreign contexts may require focused
investigation into the particular host country's treatment of
international NGOs.
The international health programs conducted by NGOs involve
such activities as direct emergency reliet provision of medical supplies
and equipment, infrastructure development, operation of clinics and
hospitals, medical training and health education. Funding sources vary
and, as noted above, the particular funder may set parameters and
conditions on these programs. Funding sources include U.S. Agency

19 For example, the Chinese authorities agreed to, "Be responsible to acquire
exemption from all import duties, fiscal charges and customs duties for all program

related materials provided by [the NGO]." Id. at art. 3(1).
20 The NGO's obligations created by the agreement with China include providing
technical expertise, securing medical equipment donations and assisting in the
development of education and treatment programs. Id. at art. 2.
21 These case studies derive from interviews with an official of a U.S. based NGO.
Redacted gratitude is duly expressed by the author.
22 See generally Cohen and Valentine, ForeignDirectInvestment in the Peoples
Republic of China: Progress,Problems andProposals,I J. CHINESE L. 161.
See NGO Law in Briefin the New Independent States, World Learning Inc.,
Forum1,Winter 1995; Irish,NGOs andThe Law: The Frameworkin Centraland
EasternEurope, CENTRAL EUROPEAN HEALTH & ENvimoNmi'r MONITOR, VOL. 3,
IssuE 1, SPrN/SUMNMER 1995.
23
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for International Development (USAID) matching grants, private
donations, gifts-in-kind of medical supplies, funding by international
corporations participating in joint ventures or with investments in the
host country, and corporate sponsorship.
The first type of program outlined below involves public health
development funded by an international for-profit investor conducting
a joint venture with a host country. This type of program is
particularly significant in that it is related to, and established by, a
for-profit international joint venture between a host government and
a foreign investor. Additionally, the following examples include giftin- kind medical supply shipments and the construction and operation
of treatment and health education facilities and clinics funded by
private donations and the host country.
A. Public HealthDevelopment in FormerSoviet Republics:
Example 1: Kazakstan
The first example is of a public health development program
funded by, and created as part of, a joint venture between an
international company and the host government. The company
contracted a U.S. based NGO to develop and coordinate a program
to improve health care in one region of the country where the joint
venture project is located. The program will spend over ten million
dollars over a number of years, in one "oblast" (region) of Kazakstan.
The program's objectives are to improve health care service delivery
and infrastructure, develop a tuberculosis management system,
improve maternal and child health services, develop pharmacies, and
create a biomedical engineering capacity to service and maintain
donated equipment.
The NGO seeks to accomplish these objectives by procuring
and shipping medical supplies and equipment, training local health
care personnel on new techniques and the use of advanced equipment,
and improving medical facilities. The NGO also seeks to advance
public health through improving health care administration and
management, developing inventory management and control systems,
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rationalizing the medical supplies distribution system, and aiding in the
transition from a completely government-run medical system to a
more market based health care industry.
The NGO's agreement with the joint venture is time-bound and
operates as a business-like, service program.24 It is common practice
for the NGO to establish a host country agreement. In this case,
however, the NGO was contracted by the joint venture.
Consequently, the NGO did not consider it necessary to create a host
country agreement, since it could operate under the framework of the
joint venture agreement made between the international corporation
and the host government. Despite good intentions, this has turned out
to be a problematic situation due to the very different natures of their
activities; with the corporation drilling for, and exporting, oil for profit
and the NGO developing health care infrastructure on a non-profit
basis. This creates constant problems and challenges to the NGO in
its operations in the host country. Thus, the NGO does not have a
formal agreement with the host country establishing its status, legal
rights, program related benefits or exemptions.
It is common practice for the NGO to require a country
agreement before beginning a program, which usually are initiated by
the host government or its health ministry. The lack of a direct host
country agreement and the solicitation of the program by the joint
venture make this example unique and have created significant
uncertainty.
The fact that the host government does not have procedures
in place to sufficiently recognize international NGOs compounds the
difficulties resulting from the lack of a direct NGO-host country
agreement. Host country agreements are also important because they
may include host country obligations to provide contributions such as
housing for expatriate staff, office space for the NGO, utilities, and
exemption from sales and personal income taxes and customs duties
for imported goods. Without a formal agreement the NGO has no
guarantee the host country will provide these benefits. Or where these

24 Supra note 15.
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benefits are informally provided, the NGO has no guarantee that they
will continue, creating uncertainty and difficulties for the NGO.
The government of Kazakstan has informally provided a
number of benefits, including tax exemptions, customs exemptions and
the free use of office space. Although the government has not yet
demanded taxes or customs duties, technically, it could, and various
local tax and airport authorities periodically make statements to that
effect. The local administration has, however, made a retroactive
demand for rent on the office space provided free of charge since the
program began in 1992. For an NGO, unexpected expenses such as
this make it very difficult for the organization to continue its
humanitarian work in the area. This highlights the precarious status
of international NGOs without a formal host country agreement or
operating in a country which lacks procedures to recognize
international NGOs.
Kazakstan is a relatively new country with a limited legal basis
for international NGOs, and scant historical experience with the
concept of NGOs. The host country may see foreign NGOs and
foreign for-profit entities alike and attempt to encourage revenue from
the activities of both, especially in this instance where the NGO's
activities were initiated by a for-profit joint venture.
Initially, the NGO sought official registration as a non-profit
organization in Kazakstan. The government required the submission
of numerous documents including articles of incorporation and
non-profit status certification from the home country, both translated
into Russian and notarized by the country and state of incorporation
as well as the U.S. State Department. Certification of the accurate
translation of these documents was also required. Recently, the host
country's laws changed, and they now require all official documents
to be resubmitted in the host country's new official language. The host
country also requires background information on the NGO and its
programs, and has recently asked for additional documents including
the professional service agreement and other contracts related to the
establishment of the program.
This entire process is conducted ad hoc for this particular
NGO, because the country has not established sufficient procedure for
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NGO recognition. Although Kazakstan recently passed a presidential
decree making recognition of international NGOs possible,2" the
Ministry of Justice has yet to establish a set procedure to recognize
international NGOs.
Kazakstan does have in place a system to recognize
international NGOs that are on a list maintained by the U.S. Embassy
in Atyrau, but that list only includes NGOs conducting programs
funded by USAID, creating another obstacle since this NGO's
programs are privately funded. Although the NGO is not on the U.S.
Embassy list, the NGO has successfully convinced the host country
that the list is irrelevant to the question of the NGO's status.
An additional impediment to the creation of an agreement
between the government and the NGO has been the fact that, until
recently, recognition required a special act of parliament or an
executive decree. Unfortunately, until a recent presidential decree,2"
such recognition was difficult in that parliament had been disbanded
and the president engaged with other, arguably more pressing matters.
The interim solution to the problem of recognition or an agreement at
the national level has been ad hoc regional or local registration. Such
registration in the oblast is temporary, and is renewed every year on
a discretionary basis. It allows exemption from taxes on a local basis.
The absence of an agreement or recognition has been the
biggest overall problem for the NGO's program in Kazakstan. The
lack of registration has caused a series of associated smaller problems,
and given rise to potential problems and uncertainty. Smaller related
problems include the host country's authorities occasionally asking
employees to pay income tax, at a high rate required of expatriates;
such taxes are not budgeted for nor expected by the NGO. The NGO
does not have the resources to avoid income taxes by rotating
employees periodically, as foreign corporations typically do.
An additional problem is that the NGO cannot buy property,
such as apartments or automobiles. The NGO must buy such items in

25
26

PresidentialProvision,supra note 1I.
Id.
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the name of individual employees or in the name of the local branch
of the Ministry of Health. This creates added liability for the NGO's
employees and bureaucratic hassles to obtain power of attorney to
allow use of the property bought in the name of the host country. At
the end ofthe program, the property acquired for the program will be
donated to the government.
Another uncertainty involves customs duties that the host
country might demand on the millions of dollars worth of donated
supplies shipped to the host country. This would amount to a
significant amount of money not foreseen by the program's budget.
There also exists the potential for harassment for fees at the airport
when shipments arrive, or where exemption from fees and taxes is in
question. Without an agreement creating legal recognition and
exemptions, there is less ground on which to resist demands for fees
and taxes, and no guarantee such informal exemptions will continue.
A potentially significant problem relating to the lack of an
agreement will arise in the event of any legal dispute. It is
questionable whether the NGO has the capacity to sue or obtain any
legal recourse against contractors, service providers or others.
Nevertheless, it is particularly worrisome considering the frequency of
contract breach in Kazakstan. Examples of contract problems include
the leasing of warehouse space, where the lessor refused to accept the
negotiated and agreed price, and a local service provider who agreed
to fix copy machines but has failed to perform on the contract.
Without some form of recognition, the NGO has questionable legal
recourse against these and other contract violations.
The case study ofKazakstan suggests the importance of a host
country agreement where foreign laws do not recognize international
NGOs or do not provide a procedure for recognizing them. It also
shows the importance of recognition and legal personality to
international NGOs. Without a host country agreement or laws
providing for recognition of international NGOs, NGOs may be
subject to the whim of the government and new requirements or
demands. Without such recognition, the NGO-host government
relationship may be in flux, providing little protection to the NGO. By
no means is a host country agreement suggested as a cure-all. For
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example, an agreement or registration may not solve uncertainties and
risks, nor provide real protection against political changes and
instability. Nonetheless, it would allow an NGO to hedge itself
against foreseeable risks.
Example 2: Uzbekistan
The second example of an NGO international health program
was initiated by a recently created long term joint venture between an
international mining corporation and the government of Uzbekistan.
This program involved the shipment of over five million U.S. dollars
worth of vaccine and general medical supplies donated by U.S.
corporations. The joint venture paid the NGO to manage the handling
and transportation of the shipments, as well as to conduct a formal
assessment of further health care needs in the host country.
The delivery of donated medical supplies usually involves a
sign off agreement from the Ministry of Health of the host country to
assure the proper use of the donated supplies. This creates a
government obligation to use the supplies appropriately. Such
agreements may require a follow-up report by the ministry, if
requested by the donating NGO. Such shipment programs create a
significant follow-up issue for the international NGO since it must
assure the appropriate use of the donated medicine and supplies."
The ongoing involvement of the joint venture and the NGO in health
programs will provide oversight to assure the proper use of the
donated material.
In this instance, the transportation of the shipment was
provided free of charge through a U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
humanitarian assistance program. The DOD program requires a letter
from the host country stating that landing and airport fees will be
waived for the humanitarian assistance flight. In addition, the NGO
requires that the same letter waive customs fees. Thus, the contracts
involved with this program include an agreement between the joint

27

See MacKenzie, supranote 12.
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venture and NGO and a sign off letter from the host government.
This example also involves an assessment of tuberculosis and
dentistry needs and the development of related programs. An NGO
assessment team first evaluates the current level of training,
technology, and treatment, and then locates in-country partners and
project sites. The assessment team then reports on its findings and
proposes programs and the level of NGO involvement. Such
involvement will then be formalized by a long term and detailed
agreement with the joint venture corporation. The NGO will then also
create a host country agreement indicating the type of support or
participation of the host government and outlining the host country's
obligations and the NGO's duties.
Although in the Kazakstan example above the health
development programs were established as part of the joint venture
arrangement with the host country, the program here was initiated
voluntarily as part of a corporate citizenship effort. These examples
show how public health development by international NGOs can be a
part of international joint venture strategy to develop good will or
serve as an added incentive to create a joint venture. The involvement
of an international NGO to conduct public health development
programs may arise as a condition of a joint venture deal or
voluntarily afterwards. Such programs may create a positive
corporate image, assure the health of local workers, protect local and
visiting expatriate workers from contagious disease, and assure access
to medical and emergency facilities for local workers and expatriates.
The program initiated in Uzbekistan demonstrates the issues
involved in providing direct humanitarian relief. It also shows how,
from the initial phases of such programs, international NGOs structure
their foreign activities and interaction with the host government to
reduce uncertainties and build a mutually beneficial and clear
long-term relationship with the host government. NGO international
health programs established by a joint venture may be considered,
indirectly, part of a foreign investment strategy, and raise investment
like issue for the NGO directly.

170 BUFFALOJOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol.3

Example 3: Buildinga Children'sHospitalin China.
In this example, the NGO, in partnership with a local medical
school and the municipal government, is constructing a state-of-theart pediatric treatment and medical training facility. Involving a multi
million dollar investment of donated funds and medical equipment, the
NGO will design the facility, equip it and train its staff.
The hospital will serve as a referral center for advanced
pediatric and tertiary care and provide a training facility for the local
medical school. The hospital will also host foreign medical volunteers
who will introduce pediatric treatment techniques and the latest
medical equipment.
In this example, the parallels between for-profit and non-profit
investment are evident. The size of the project, the nature of the
activities and the partnership with the host government is similar to
those involved in for-profit investment activities. One example of this
involves the NGOs name. A local entity began using the NGO's
recognized and well-respected name, without permission, to
fraudulently raise funds for itself The NGO was forced to change the
name of its in-country group to separate itself from the fraudulent
Chinese fund-raisers. This problem is similar to trademark or
servicemark protection problems that for-profit investors confront in
foreign countries. One obvious, and most significant, difference
between a for-profit and non-profit investor in this example is that the
NGO will not receive revenue from the project.
V. ISSUES FOR NGOs UNDER INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW

As indicated by the above case studies, NGOs face unique
problems that may exceed those of for-profit investors. Although
international law, domestic host country law or the host country-NGO
agreement may resolve or mitigate some of these problems, there
remain significant sources of uncertainty for international NGOs. A
carefully drafted host country agreement and dispute resolution
arrangement that recognizes the inadequacies of international
commercial law and includes the possibility of arbitration provides an
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essential mechanism for mitigating these uncertainties.
As suggested above, international law does not incorporate
provisions governing the status and protection of NGOs.28 There
exist, however, a number of instruments relevant to the problems
faced by international NGOs generally and those engaged in
commercial-like projects.29 These instruments provide a measure of
relief, yet may also be difficult to apply to international NGO
activities. First, the European Convention on the Recognition of the
Legal Personality of International Non-Governmental Organizations"
(hereinafter European Convention) obligates ratifying states to
recognize international NGOs and provide them, as a matter of right,
the protections and status they enjoy in their home countries.31
Entering into force in 1991, the European Convention has less than
ten states as parties, all members of the Council of Europe. States
which are not members of the Council may accede to the European
Convention with the approval of the Council ofEurope.32 Thus, while
this convention has few state parties, it may become an internationally
accepted instrument and provide a standard for the recognition of the
legal personality of NGOs.33
An additional set of international agreements relevant to the
protection and recognition of NGOs is the network of Bilateral
Investment Treaties (BITs) established to provide national treatment

28

YVES BEIGBEDER, THE ROLE AND STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTEERS AND

ORoANizATIONS: THE RIGHT AND Dtn' TO HUMAmNTARIAN ASSISTANCE 327 (1991).
29 See generally id. at 331-36.
30
EuropeanConvention on the Recognitionof the Legal Personalityof International
Non-GovernmentalOrganizations,1986 EtuR. Y.B. (Council of Eur.) 34,35.
30 Id., art.2 at 35.
31 Id.
32 Id., art. 7 at 37.
33 The U.S.-Iran Claims Tribunal reached a decision in International
Schools
Services, inc. v. Iranian Copper Industries which accords with the European
Convention's core principle that NGOs and their legal capacity are governed by the
laws of the place of formation. 5 U.S.-IRAN CLAIMS TRIBtNAL REPORTS, 338, 345;
see, Goldman, CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS ININTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 113, 116.
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to foreign investors in accordance with international standards.34
Article 1 of the prototypical BIT defines "company" as:
any entity constituted or organized under applicable
law, whether or not for profit, and whether privately
or governmentally owned or controlled, and includes
a corporation, trust, partnership, sole proprietorship,
branch, joint venture, association, or other
organization."
This provision explicitly covers NGOs and is particularly
significant given the wide adoption of BITs,36 and considering that
some foreign NGO laws place international agreements such as these
above domestic legislation on NGOs. For example, Uzbekistan's law
"Concerning Social Organizations" provides:
[i]f an international agreement of the Republic of
Uzbekistan establishes other rules than those contained
in this Law, the rules of the international agreement
take precedence.3"
Although, as of June 1994, the United States does not have a
BIT with Uzbekistan, it has ratified one with Kazakstan, and signed
one with Russia.38 Regardless of provisions in foreign NGO laws that
give primacy to international agreements, BITs offer international
See, Eleanor Roberts Lewis, The United States BilateralInvestment Treaty
Program:Protectionfor US. Investors Overseas, THE COMMERCE DEPARTIENT
SPEAKS ON INTERNATIONAL T.AE AND INvESTMENT 1994, 127 art. 2 (PLI Corp.
Law & Practice Handbook Series No. 863, 1994).
" Id. at 134.
3 Jeswald Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth ofBilateralInvestment Treaties and
Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L. L. 655
1990).
7 Law Concerning Social Organizations in the Republic of Uzbekistan, adopted Feb
15, 1991, art. 26.
38 Lewis, supranote 34, at 132.
34
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NGOs an important source of protection that accords with the
standards reflected in the European Convention and international
arbitral decisions.
The prototypical BIT also contains provisions for the
settlement of investment disputes. 9 Article 9(1) defines investment
disputes to include disputes between individuals or companies and a
state party.' Further, Article 9(2) opens host country courts to the
foreign investor, or allows resolution as previously agreed, when a
dispute arises.4 1 If a dispute is not submitted for resolution under
Article 9(2), and three months has elapsed, the foreign investor may
submit the dispute to arbitration at the International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), in accordance with
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or under another set of arbitration rules
or institutions4 2 as agreed by the parties to the dispute."3
Significantly, article 9(4) of the prototypical BIT operates as
an explicit consent of the states party to the BIT to submit the dispute
to arbitration. 44 This consent satisfies the ICSID Convention's
requirement for a "written consent" and the requirement of the U.N.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (New York Convention) for an "agreement in writing"."
These provisions give foreign NGOs an important right to access host

country courts or to submit disputes to international arbitration.
This protection is especially significant given the lack of legal
status and insufficient protections NGOs often face in host countries.
Arbitration offers international NGOs an important avenue of recourse
in disputes with host countries, especially where access to courts is
unavailable or the parties seek a less contentious means of dispute
3 Ahmed Sadek EI-Kosheri, ICSID ArbitrationandDeveloping Countries, 8 ICSID
REv. - FOREIGN INVESTMENT L. J. 107 (1993).
40 Lewis, supranote 34, art. 9(1).
41 Id. art. 9(2).
42

See Horacio A. Grigera Naon, ICC Arbitrationand Developing Countries, 8

ICSID REv. - FOREIGN INvEsTmENT L. J. 116 (1993).
43 Lewis, supranote 34, art. 9(3).
44 Id. art. 9(4).
45
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resolution. Often, the protection of an amicable relationship between
an NGO and a host government requires a less confrontational method
of dispute resolution such as arbitration. Thus, arbitration may offer
a viable option where host state courts, home state espousal and other
forums fail to provide redress.'
The system of international arbitration, however, established
for commercial transactions and disputes arising from international
agreements may create challenges for international NGOs. Important
provisions from the ICSID and New York Conventions demonstrate
the problems NGOs may encounter related to the applicability of
international commercial arbitration conventions. Additionally, similar
to for-profit investors, NGOs must overcome host country sovereign
immunity, which insulates governments from judicial decisions
enforcing arbitral awards or NGO rights, and the difficulty of
enforcing an arbitral award against a foreign government in general.
First, the ICSID Convention offers a unique venue for
international investors that have disputes with host states. The
Convention establishes, under the aegis of the World Bank, an
institutional mechanism available to foreign investors and host
governments seeking to arbitrate international investment related
disputes. ICSID is available to parties that have ratified the
Convention and their nationals, both natural and juridical.47 ICSID
arbitral awards against foreign governments are frequently accepted
by host governments due to ICSID's association with the World
42
Bank.
Although no NGO has been (as of 1993) a party to a dispute
before an ICSID arbitral panel, ICSID arbitration may offer NGOs a
means of resolving investment related disputes.49 Critical to the
applicability of the ICSID Convention to international NGO activities

MacKenzie, supra note 12 at 218.
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States, March 18, 1965, art. 1(2) and 25(2), 17 U.S.T. 1273, 1280, 575
U.N.T.S. 162, 174 [hereinafter Convention].
48 MacKenzie, supra note 12 at 221, 232.
41 Id. at219.
46

47
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is the definition of "investment" as used to determine ICSID
jurisdiction.50 Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, providing the
basis for jurisdiction, thus reads: "[t]he jurisdiction of the Center shall
extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment,
between a contracting state... and a national of another contracting
state, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to
the center. . . . " While this provision would seem to cover much of
the international activity of NGOs, especially where it is of a
commercial or contractual nature, ICSID tribunals have not given an
elaborate definition of what constitutes an "investment dispute". It
would likely be given a broad definition to allow ICSID jurisdiction
over international NGO activities.52
Although the Convention does not define the extent of the
term "investment", it may be interpreted to include international
NGOs. It has been observed that, as a precaution, NGOs relying on
an ICSID arbitration clauses in contracts with foreign governments
should explicitly define the term "investment" in the contract to
include the NGOs activities.53 Although including such a definition in
an agreement is important, it will not alone establish ICSID
jurisdiction, and the parties must have at least some form of economic
relationship.54 This aspect of international commercial arbitration
highlights the difficulties international NGOs may face, and shows the
need to carefully structure arbitration clauses,55 in order to account for
50 Id. at 223.
51 Id. at 222.
52

MacKenzie, supra note 12, at 208-212. See also Rand, Hornick and Friedland,

ICSID'sEmerging Jurisprudence:The Scope of ICSID'sJurisdiction,19 N.Y.U. J.
INT'LL. &POL. 33, 33-38.
" Id. at 208-9.
14

Id. at 209.

55 See generally,Lecuyer-Thieffiy and Thieffly, NegotiatingSettlement of Dispute
Provisionsin InternationalBusiness Contracts:Recent Developments in Arbitration

andother Processes,45 Bus. L. 577 (1990); Stephen A. Hochman, Model Dispute
Resolution Provisionsfor Use in CommercialAgreements Between Parties With
EqualBargainingPower, C976 ALI-ABA 189 (1994); Emmanuel Gaillard, Some
Notes on the Draftingof ICSID ArbitrationClauses, 477 PLI/Comm 33, 3 ICSID
REv. 1988; Dana Freyer, Alternative Dispute Resolution: How to Use it to Your
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the gaps in international private investment when applied to NGOs.
A second issue for international NGOs considering arbitration
concerns the enforcement of arbitral awards. The New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards assures the enforcement of arbitral awards from foreign
arbitral tribunals in states ratifying the Convention. Of particular
concern for international NGOs seeking the enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards is Article 1(3), which allows state parties to declare
reservations that may either require reciprocity or limit the
Convention: "to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether
contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the
'
Of the
national law of the State making such declaration." 56
York
the
New
ratifying
approximately one hundred nations
Convention, some twenty-five have made the commercial reservation
allowed under article 1(3), including the United States" and China."
A narrow definition of "commercial" by domestic courts enforcing an
arbitral award under the New York Convention, as allowed by Article
1(3), limits the applicability ofthe Convention and may undermine the
ability of NGOs to rely on it for the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards." In contrast, BITs do not necessarily allow such commercial

Advantage, InternationalCommercialArbitrationClause Checklist, C976 ALI-ABA
413 (1994).
56 Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Dec.
29, 1970, art. 1(3), 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York
Convention]. See also 9 USC § 202.
57 TheU.S. defines commerce broadly, narrowing the scope of the U.S. commercial
reservation, 9 U.S.C § 1; see also, Joseph T. McLaughlin, Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards Under the New York Convention: Practice in U.S. Courts, 477 PLIIComm.
275,278.
58 See, Ge Liu and Alexander Lourie, InternationalCommercial Arbitrationin
China: History,New Developments, and CurrentPractice,28 J. MARSHALL L. REv.
539 (1995); Bruce R. Schulberg, Note, China's Accession to the New York
Convention: An Analysis of the New Regime of Recognition and Enforcement of
ForeignArbitralAwards,3 J. CHINESEL. 117, 125 (1989).
59 Kenneth T. Ungar, Note, The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under
UNCITRAL's Model Law on InternationalCommercialArbitration, 25 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 717, 721 (1987).
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reservations.60
A similar problem may arise in respect to NGOs under
UNCITRAL's Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,"'
incorporated into some domestic legislation governing arbitration.
The Model Law is limited in scope to "all relationships of a
commercial nature .. .,.2
This provision broadens the term
"commercial", in order to minimize varying domestic interpretations
of the term, as applied under the New York Convention, and expand
the enforceability of arbitral awards.63
Thus, important considerations for international NGOs include
whether the host country has adopted the ICSID and New York
Conventions, or incorporated the Model Law into its legislation. Also
significant is whether the host country has made a commercial
reservation to the New York Convention and defines "commercial"
broadly in the event that it has made such a reservation. Depending
on the answers to these questions, NGOs may encounter less difficulty
obtaining redress through arbitration or enforcing an arbitral award.
Ideally, the NGO will take such circumstances into account and
include an arbitration clause in a host country agreement.
One final issue important to the enforcement of arbitral awards
against a foreign government concerns the host government's
sovereign immunity. While comparative laws on sovereign immunity
vary, the United States considers an agreement to arbitrate an implicit
waiver of sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act (FSIA)." In order to enforce an arbitral award in the U.S. against
a foreign country, the agreement to arbitrate, the legal relationship
between the parties or the dispute itself must have some connection

60 Schulberg, supranote 58, at 119.
61

U.N. GAOR 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, 24 I.L.M. 1302,

Chapter VIII.
Id. at § 1315, See also Michael Durgavich, Comment, Resolving DisputesArising

62

Out of the Persian Gulf War: Independent Enforceability of International
Agreements to Arbitrate, 22 CAL.W. INT'L L.J. 389,404,428.
63 Ungar, supranote 59, at 737.
6 28 USC see. 1605a(6).
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to the United States.65
The FSIA is similar in this respect to the European Convention
on State Immunity. The Convention also treats arbitral agreements as
waivers of sovereign immunity.66 This waiver of sovreign immunity
by agreement to arbitrate significantly increases the value of a host
government's agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, since it
cannot invoke sovereign immunity to defeat the arbitration or
enforcement of an arbitral award. Additionally, the FSIA allows
attachment of a foreign state's property used for commercial activity
under certain circumstances, making sovereign immunity less of a bar
to collection on an arbitral award against a foreign, host government.6

CONCLUSION

The case studies and discussion show the difficulties NGOs
confront when engaged in international projects. The program
examples suggest the similarities NGOs have with for-profit investors,
and that international NGO programs may be directly linked to foreign
investment projects. These examples highlight the importance of legal
recognition and dispute resolution procedures.
This paper suggests a number of things NGOs might consider
when structuring their international programs. First, the NGO should
investigate the relevant provisions of the host country's laws relating
to international NGOs. Issues of particular significance include
whether the local laws provide for recognition of the NGO's legal
status and tax or other exemptions. Second, the NGO should
consider whether the host government has ratified any of the
international agreements relevant to international NGOs discussed

65 Id.

66 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN TREATY SERIES No. 74, EUROPEAN CONVENTION
ON STATE IMMUNITY AND ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL (CONVENTION EURoPtENNE SUR
L'I muNrrt DES TATS ET PROTOCOLE ADDMONNEL) art. 12 (1972).
67 28 USC see. 1610.
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here.
Third, where relevant international agreements exist, the NGO
should consider whether reservations have been made and the effect
of the agreements and reservations in host country courts, especially
their applicability to international NGOs. Fourth, even where host
country NGO laws and appropriate international agreements exist, a
host country agreement provides added protection, especially where
it incorporates an arbitration clause. Finally, where an arbitration
clause is incorporated, whether in the host country agreement or other
contracts, it should be tailored to anticipate the difficulties NGOs
might face in applying international arbitration instruments to their
disputes and activities.

